Values in a materialist universe

Ronald Dworkin, in his Religion Without God, insists that an atheist can nevertheless be religious. The religious attitude amounts to the belief that (a) there are objective moral and aesthetic values, and (b) that it matters objectively how we live our lives. Since, however, values are not studied by natural science, objective value takes us beyond nature, and should lead us to reject Naturalism. “The religious attitude rejects all forms of naturalism. It insists that values are real and fundamental, not just manifestations of something else; they are as real as trees or pain.” (p. 13) Now the problem I have with this is Dworkin's insistence that values are objective. What exactly could this mean? Certainly values are real in the sense that there are indeed certain ends that are pursued for their own sake, rather than for the sake of anything else. This is simply an anthropological fact, and therefore a natural fact. To call these values “objective” adds nothing except metaphysical obscurity. Similarly, Dworkin insists that beauty is a real property of things. Now beauty is real insofar as we do in fact take aesthetic delight in various objects. But again, to call this beauty “objective” is mysterious and obscure and adds nothing. The idea, I suppose, is that we can be mistaken in terms of what we value. Now this is in a certain sense clearly true, insofar as our judgements of value rest on factual or metaphysical beliefs that may turn out to be mistaken in the event. A monk may value a life of prayer and fasting, because he believes that this is a way for him to become closer to God. But if God is an illusion, then it would seem that the end he pursues is chimerical. But notice that in this case the life of prayer and fasting is not, strictly, an ultimate value. It is not pursued for its own sake, but rests on certain fundamental beliefs. Now, there are pursuits that we value that are not dependent on other beliefs. I value reading philosophy, and I get a great deal of pleasure from so doing. But I don't think that my enjoyment rests on any particular beliefs about the philosophic enterprise itself. It is true that in valuing philosophy (as opposed to just deriving enjoyment from it) I want the activity of philosophy to be pursued into the indefinite future by others; but this does not mean that I can furnish a “good reason” why it should be pursued by anyone who does not share my tastes. I might recommend philosophy to someone, and hope that he comes to share my taste, but this is not to furnish a reason; and, in any case, I should not make such a recommendation to just anyone. The vast majority of people are quite unfitted to philosophy, and would probably derive little benefit from it. The fact that I personally value something does, in general, mean that I want it to continue to be pursued by others – I would be unhappy to learn that after my death the philosophic enterprise were to die out – but it does not mean that I think philosophy makes a “demand” on “everyone” to pursue it. So again, it is unclear what could be meant by saying that the activity of philosophy has “objective” value. Similar considerations apply to aesthetic judgements. Certainly, I believe it would be tragic if a time came about when no human, or human-descendent, was capable of perceiving the beauty of a boy. But those who were thus blind to this form of beauty would not feel it as a deprivation, any more than I feel it a deprivation that I cannot perceive the beauty of a female. If we insist that male beauty is “objective”, what ground could we have for denying this of female beauty as well? And what would it mean to ascribe “objective” beauty to females? Does it mean that I ought to perceive female beauty? Or that it is tragic that I do not? And yet for me to perceive female beauty would, in some sense, be for me to be a different person, and I do not wish to be a different person. The ascription of “objectivity” to beauty is therefore obscure. For these reasons, I reject Dworkin's notion that there are non-natural properties, or that ethics or aesthetics constitute a proof of the existence of the non-natural. The fact is that by the time we are capable of philosophic reflection we already find ourselves with a personality, and therewith with preferences and projects that seem meaningful to us. Indeed, our philosophic reflection will itself belong to one such project. The meaning of life is to pursue those projects that are in fact meaningful to us, that is, to live life in as interesting a manner as possible; ulterior meanings are an illusion. Morality certainly stands in no need of any metaphysical or transcendental foundation, as Plato himself proved decisively in the Euthyphro. Is an action pious because all the gods approve it, or do the gods approve it because it is pious? In the former case, piety is bleached of all moral content; in the latter, it is independent of the gods' approval. Humans are social animals, and our societies depend on trust in order to function; and we find ourselves with an original instinct towards the socially cooperative behaviour necessary for all to flourish. As a result of our ordinary interactions with others, in which we find meaning, we want not just to be trusted but to be worthy of trust. Morality, in this sense, requires no further foundation. Does naturalism then have any effect on morality? I think it does, insofar as it undermines that portion of morality that is due to religious belief. Someone who believes that the foetus is inviolable because that is what God enjoins might well abandon that belief if he comes to disbelieve in God and can think of no secular justification for the prohibition on abortion. And in fact those who oppose abortion do in general do so on religious or transcendentalist grounds. In practice, a secular morality is bound to be utilitarian. I think it will ultimately coincide with a rule-utilitarianism. We would follow our ordinary moral practices, such as keeping our promises, without referring every action to some sort of theoretical calculus of benefit. But these practices themselves will be capable of criticism or justification in terms of their benefit to society. So it is right to keep one's promises, since in making a promise one specifically appeals to the trust that is necessary to all social cooperation, and without which social cooperation would scarcely be possible. But I want to end with an ethical conundrum. Let us imagine two possible far future societies. In the first, people are moderately happy and the beauty of boys is often appreciated. In the second, people are even happier, but, as a result of genetic engineering or whatever, no one is capable of appreciating boyish beauty. Obviously, the denizens of this latter society do not miss this capacity, any more than I miss the capacity to appreciate female beauty. Now in fact I am inclined to believe that in a society in which boyish beauty were appreciated people would be happier. But setting that aside, I find that of my two societies, I would prefer the former to the latter even though, by hypothesis, the former has less “happiness”. So does this not show that I am not in fact a complete utilitarian when it comes to morality? My preference for the first society is clearly an ethical preference in some broad sense, but possibly not a “moral” one in the narrower sense. For I can give no impersonal justification for it. All I can say is that as a boysexual man I value the appreciation of boyish beauty, and would be sad to think that it would come to an end any time soon. So it may be that the secular content of morality is utilitarian, but that morality does not coincide with the whole of ethics, which latter includes a personal element such as cannot be made to appeal to all rational enquirers. And this, after all, is quite an interesting conclusion.