Re: Tibetan Buddhism

Not quite sure about the relevance of that. My purpose in my little essay was to consider the question of whether the existence of ethical and aesthetic value shows that naturalism is false, as Dworkin argued. My conclusion was that ethics involves an ineliminable element of the personal, and that ultimate values cannot therefore be held to constitute "objective", non-natural properties. I am not at all sure what the Buddhist view on this matter would be. It's an interesting issue. In modern times, B. R. Ambedkar constructed Navayāna, or Dalit Buddhism, which claims to be completely consistent with philosophical naturalism. It rejects all other extant schools of Buddhism and is seen by its followers as constituting yet another 'turning' of the ever-mobile Dharma-wheel. But I confess that I haven't yet read Ambedkar's book (The Buddha and His Dhamma, 1957). I am always suspicious of "guides" to Buddhism "which cater especially for Westerners". I always feel that they distort Buddhist ideas to make them more acceptable to western ideological prejudices. I prefer relying on proper scholars, such as Richard Gombrich (see, for example, his What the Buddha Thought, Equinox Publishing, 2009).