Counterfactuals in a deterministic universe

The issue of the status of counterfactuals in a deterministic universe is a large one. But that, at least prima facie, the determinist is allowed his subjunctive conditionals can be shown by taking an example where the antecedents of the event in question are unarguably purely physical and subject to physical law (and in a sphere where quantum indeterminacy - which I personally believe is not metaphysically ultimate - does not apply). Thus suppose that as a result of an unexpected snowfall one evening there's an avalanche that buries a house in the valley below. No one supposes that the weather is anything other than a completely deterministic system, or that snowflakes are endowed with "free will", but it would surely still be meaningful - and quite possibly true - to say "Had it not snowed the previous evening, the avalanche would not have happened and the house would not have been buried." This is not obviously contradicted by saying that the snowfall was bound to happen given certain antecedent conditions. However, as I say, there's more to it than that, and there are interesting philosophical issues and objections that can be raised, but the matter is not a straightforward one. So long as counterfactuals are admitted, then, even in a deterministic universe, Paul still had to make a choice and the choice was free in the only sense that mattered, that had he chosen differently the outcome would have been different. The metaphysical notion of "free will", insofar as it is incompatible with causal determinism, is, so I would hold, nothing more than a will-o'-the-wisp of human fancy in the service of our unconquerable egoism that likes to think we constitute an exception to the order of nature. But when, in the next hundred or so years, artificial intellects are created, far more sophisticated than any human brain, and begin to guide and control human species destiny, this egoism will hardly survive, since it will be obvious to everyone that even beings more sophisticated than ourselves are ultimately just (inconceivably complicated) machines. I might reply to your other post when I have the time - and also to Pharmakon's post about truth; but these days I have so many tasks to perform in the real world that I require all the arms of the mighty Lord Vishnu to accomplish them.