Threaded index Date index FAQ
Benign Sexual Variation
Posted by Pharmakon on 2026-February-10 14:31:01, TuesdayIn reply to Re: Roger Lancaster, The War on Sex posted by Bromios on 2026-February-3 22:55:01, Tuesday
|
Lancaster writes that the new emphasis on the age taboo "revives the idea that sex is the basis for morality, and it disallows on principle what Gayle Rubin calls a "concept of benign sexual variation." In reproducing the quote, you left out the emphasis Lancaster places on the word "the" in the phrase "the basis for morality." But even without the emphasis, I think it is clear that Lancaster is not arguing sex cannot be "a vital part of the moral code." He is arguing rather against a view that might be characterized as (though he doesn't use the term) "sexceptionalism," that is, the view that sex has moral implications that are different from, and more important than, the moral implications of, well, pretty much anything else. This is why he invokes Rubin's formulation. Sexceptionalism (it has a Newgon entry, linked below) "disallows on principle" the very concept that sexual variation can be benign. So it is not a question of differences of opinion about what sexual variations are or are not benign. Rational discussion of that question is ruled out by sexceptionalism, because, in the words of Scott DeOrio (quoted at Newgon): The sex-specific nature of sex crime law enshrines the assumption that sex is something that is uniquely harmful, rather than a key aspect of human flourishing, [and] contributes to the stigmatization and demonization of sex itself as well as to the repression of benign sexual variation. “Sex” is not a synonym for “harm,” and the law should not treat it as such. Neither Lancaster nor Rubin nor De Orio is arguing that "we've outgrown the need for" morality in sex. Their claim is that rather than discussing whether any particular sexual behavior is benign, we erect "walls" like those in Rubin's Figure 9.2 to divide a few categories of "good" sex from broader (if less commonly practiced) categories of "bad" sex. The "redoubling of taboos around age" (as you point out itself recent, but a "reconfiguration" of older taboos) that Lancaster deplores has firmly placed pederasty well on the "bad" side of the wall(s) Rubin illustrates. Where we seem to differ is over whether pederasty can be moved from where it is now onto into the realm of "good" sex, or at least the realm where good and bad are contested, while leaving various other practices where they currently stand, or whether for age gap sex to be viewed differently it will be necessary to break down the current system of categorization in a more fundamental way. The latter approach would be making additional room for sexual variation in general, and not just pederastic practices, to be viewed as benign. To be clear, I see no necessary conflict between the two approaches, though I am inclined to view the second approach as more promising. The conflict, imho, only arises to the extent advocates of pederasty actively oppose bringing any currently stigmatized behaviors outside mentorship pederasty inside Rubin's "charmed circle" (Figure 9.1) of benignity. This conflict becomes especially acute to the extent advocates of pederasty emphasize that other sexual practices -- in particular homosexuality as it developed and won grudging acceptance over the last three and a half centuries -- lack such a legitimizing history. Pederasty is, after all, male-male sexuality, and despite the notable differences I see considerable overlap. The acceptance such sexuality has achieved should, imho, be viewed as something advocates of pederasty can build on. hugzu ;-p  [@nonymouse] [Guardster] [Proxify] [Anonymisierungsdienst] |
Follow ups:
