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The classical notion of freedom does not presuppose what you claim it does. What I described of it is something consistent with all sorts of philosophies of mind and soul. No real distinction between self and emotions is necessitated or even implied by it. In fact, very little about the psyche is implied by it except for one thing: that the capacity to choose at all is not the Queen of the Virtues, and is neither the definition nor the arbiter of freedom. Certainly what I described was nothing we will find "defined" quite that way in Western history, since there so many diverse concepts of freedom are consistent with it: I'm illustrating the classical notion negatively, as the broad set of notions that the modern notion of freedom is not. (Your reaction has shown me that weakness in my presentation; in the future I'll be clearer about this.) It was, in the past, unnecessary for anyone to argue for what was, before modernity, perfectly obvious. That my particular example of the self's capacity to make itself less free (maybe more of a schema than an example) reminds you of a Socratic view of the psyche is very interesting. It demonstrates the impact of Phaedo on what we presume about classical notions of freedom and will. But we could just as well pick The Republic, or Augustine, or Thomas, or Maimonides, or Spinoza, all of whom have distinctly different views of the human psyche, yet all of whom would reject modernity's notion freedom as sheer will, sheer capacity to choose. That modern notion, developed at the end of the Middle Ages (voluntarism!), hit a high point with Nietzsche (will to power!), and has now pervaded liberal -- to wit, almost everyone's -- grasp of the concept of freedom. "I am not truly free unless I am able to do whatever the fuck I wanna do, right or wrong." Here we are, largely living with that as ideology... I find your penultimate suggestion very interesting: The cure for all this is not to attempt to revert to the notion of a metaphysical element outside the order of phenomena, but to recognise the fundamentally embodied and socially embedded nature of man.I agree with the second, positive part of your suggestion (to claim anything about the "nature of man" these days is already dare-devil). But I'm not sure I understand the first part, especially since it seems to me that recognition of the "fundamentally embodied and socially embedded nature of man" actually requires a metaphysical element "outside the order of phenomena." That recognition, which to me is correct, must be based on some sort of metaphysical bias, as there is nothing in "the order of phenomena" itself that necessitates that recognition. How do we discover that "order" of phenomena? Why do we presume there is such an order? Whatever the answer to those questions, it lies outside the order of phenomena, certainly of "ordinary" phenomena. True, we will perhaps not settle such matters here, but discussion of them helps clarify things. It is no coincidence that precisely these issues arise for us pederasts here and now as they did for those pederasts of Socrates age. I herewith raise a toast to Socrates, Diogenes, and hoi paides kaloi! |